In this paper, we discuss non-interactive updating of decryption keys in identity-based encryption (IBE). IBE is a public key cryptosystem where a public key is an arbitrary string. In practice, key revocation is a necessary and inevitable process and IBE is no exception when it comes to having to manage revocation of decryption keys without losing its merits in efficiency. Our main contribution of this paper is to propose novel constructions of IBE where a decryption key can be renewed without having to make changes to its public key, i.e. user's identity. We achieve this by extending the hierarchical IBE (HIBE). Regarding security, we address semantic security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks for a very strong attack environment that models all possible types of key exposures in the random oracle model. Straightforward extension of the HIBE, however, does not achieve our goal as such a scheme is completely insecure under our attack model. In addition to this, we show method of constructing a partially collusion resistant HIBE from arbitrary IBE in the random oracle model. By combining both results, we can construct an IBE with non-interactive key update from only an arbitrary IBE.
Introduction
Background. As to our best of knowledge, current public key infrastructures involve complex construction of certification authorities (CA), consequently requiring expensive communication and computation costs for certificate verification. In 1984, Shamir introduced an innovative concept called identity-based encryption (IBE) [26] (later actualized in [7] ) where any public key is determined as an arbitrary string, e.g. user's name, e-mail address, etc. which simplifies certificate management in public key infrastructures. In this paper, we address non-interactive updating of user's decryption key in IBE. Revocation and renewal of decryption key is a necessary process carried out in practice, and so, designing of IBE which allows renewal and updating of decryption keys without losing its merits in efficiency will have considerable implications in the practical crypto-infrastructure. In a conventional public key scheme, certification revocation list (CRL) [30] is utilized to minimize the damage caused by key compromisation. Users can become aware of other users' revoked keys by referring to the CRL. Straightforward implementation of CRL will not be, however, the best solution for IBE, as in the CRL, public key will also be renewed. Recall that public key for IBE represents an identity and is not desired to be changed. One application of IBE is of a mobile phone scenario, in which case, phone number represents the user identity. It will be both simple and convenient for the mobile phone users to be able to communicate and into multiple levels. Each level has its own device which updates the device of a level below, each level with varying updating periods. We let the lowest level PD be the least secure device (i.e. PD-BC) of which the keys are updated more frequently than the ones in the higher levels. Security of the devices in each level also increases as the level of the hierarchy goes higher. As an example, the least secure device, PD-BC, updates the decryption key everyday and the helper key stored in the PD-BC is updated (using the PD of a level higher) every 2-3 months. Since lower level PDs are used more frequently, they must be kept in places more handy (e.g. at home or work place) and higher level PDs which are used not as frequently be kept somewhere not as convenient but physically safer (e.g. safe). Our IBE system can guarantee the security even if any level PD is compromised even of the highest one.
Related Works. The problem of revocability of private keys in identity-based schemes was initially discussed by Shinozaki, Itoh, Fujioka and Tsujii [27] . It, however, required prior communication for revocation and therefore, did not show advantage over conventional public key schemes in terms of cost efficiency, and also required prior interaction between the user and the certificate authority. Furthermore, their scheme was specific to Fiat-Shamir identification scheme [19, 20] and could not generally be applied to identity-based schemes. Recently, Baek and Zheng [2] showed an application of threshold decryption method to IBE. It does decrease the possibility of getting the keys to be exposed in the first place, however, it does not deal with what it can do after key exposure has actually occured. In [16] , Dodis and Yung proposed an interesting idea that refreshes the private keys in HIBE. Their scheme provides a solution to the problem of gradual key exposure in which the private key is assumed to slowly compromise over time. Boneh and Franklin in their paper ( [7] , Section 1.1.1) showed the first generalized method for key revocation in IBE schemes. In their scheme, a privileged Private Key Generator (PKG) generates each user's decryption key where its corresponding public key is set to be the concatenation of user identity and fixed length of time the key is available, e.g. "recipient@xxx.xxx || 2005.01.01-2005.12.31". In such a setting, the public key, despite of whether it is revoked or not, is renewed regularly by the PKG, and also, the renewal interval must be set short (e.g. per day) to alleviate the damage caused by key exposures. Therefore, having to set the interval short and require frequent contacts with the PKG implies increase in the total communication and computation cost, consequently, losing one of primary advantages of IBE (i.e. low costs in communication and computation). Further, it needs to work out a way to establish a secure channel between the PKG and the user. For instance, it needs to compensate for additional transmission for key issuing and also has to deal with complicated transactions if the secret information used to setup the secure channel is exposed. Moreover, forward security must be considered. It is, hence, not desirable to have to require frequent communication via secure channel with the PKG in IBE as it implicates loss of primary advantages of IBE.
While, on the other hand, as a solution to key exposure and revocation problem in conventional public key systems, Dodis, Katz, Xu and Yung [13] proposed a scheme called key-insulated encryption. As said earlier, this scheme also assumes a PD in which it stores the helper key. The helper key assists the user to renew his decryption key by generating secrets necessary to update the key. Here, the public key is fixed. In [14, 15] , Dodis, Franklin, Katz, Miyaji and Yung further improved [13] with an additional property, forward security. Notice that being able to renew the decryption key without having to make any changes to the corresponding public key as in the key-insulated encryption scheme, is the very technique, desired in IBE. Possible harmonization of the advantages of the two schemes; an identity-based version of a (strongly secure) key-insulated encryption scheme has never been constructed before. Also, there has never been a construction built of a hierarchical version of key-insulated encryption where the PD is organized in a hierarchical tree structure. Besides the related works shown so far, there are other interesting researches done on the topic of key exposure and revocation as well, for example, [23, 1] , but both are looked from a non identity-based perspective.
We mentioned earlier that our IBE with non-interactive key update is constructed by extending the HIBE [25, 24] . HIBE is a powerful cryptographic tool and also forms the basis of various cryptographic techniques, e.g. [11] . However, all methods known to construct HIBE [25, 24, 11, 4, 6] require specific assumptions in elliptic curve cryptography, e.g. the BDH problem [7, 8] as the underlying assumption and therefore lacks flexibility in selecting the underlying assumption. (While for IBE, besides BDH, there is also a construction based on quadratic residuosity problem [10] .) There is also an open problem for a generic construction of HIBE based on arbitrary IBE and is one of important research topics in this area.
Model and Definitions
Overview of the Model. Before we start discussing the details of the actual construction of our IBE scheme, recall earlier how we said it was impossible to construct an IBE that allows an essential property as key revocation if based on the model of conventional IBE. To be more specific, it is impossible, based on the conventional IBE model, for the user to immediately revoke and renew his decryption key only at times he needs to renew the decryption key without losing the advantage of IBE in terms of communication cost, since in the conventional IBE, a public parameter distributed at system set up phase and the user's identity are the only parameters used to encrypt a message.
Recall that we said earlier, [7] showed the first generalized method for key revocation based on the conventional IBE model. Their scheme, however, required to establish a secure channel between a user and a PKG which also needed to be available at all times. Moreover, the burden on the PKG was heavy which required the PKG to periodically renew the users' decryption keys at fixed and frequent time intervals. Their model is simple and generally does not have any problem using it and may be practical for some applications. However, there are other situations where their assumption is neither preferred nor available.
We introduce a new model of IBE that can renew and update the decryption keys non-interactively (i.e without any loss in communication cost). We introduce a private device (PD) which stores the helper key used to renew the decryption key at regular time intervals without requiring interactions with other entities. We further improve the security by giving hierarchical construction in the PD, letting the keys of each level be renewed using the devices of a level higher (See Applications: Mobile Phone Scenario in Sec. 1.). Our model can be regarded as both hierarchical and identity-based extension of key-insulated encryption [13] . Similar to [13] , we address random-access key-update, namely, allowing one-step renewal of current decryption key to any of the decryption keys of any time period (even the past keys). Random-access key-update lets any ciphertext of any time period to be decrypted at any time.
Model. In our model, private devices are structured hierarchically into -levels, and for i = 1, · · · , , i-th level helper key is stored in the i-th level device. Decryption key is stored in the 0-level PD (i.e. mobile phone). Key-update information is generated using the i-th level helper key which is used to renew the (i − 1)-th level helper key for i = 2, · · · , . Decryption key is renewed using the helper key of the 1st-level PD (i.e. PD-BC). To make things simple, we consider = 2: 1st-and 2nd-level PD corresponds to PD-BC and PD that updates PD-BC helper key, respectively. (Note that this can be generalized for arbitrary ≥ 1.) Now, let T 0 (·) and T 1 (·) map time to corresponding time periods for decryption key and 1st-level helper key, respectively. assuming that decryption key and 1st-level helper key is updated every day and every 2-3 months, respectively. In addition, we let T 2 (·) be a function such that for all time, T 2 (time) = 0. At time, time, user updates his decryption key if 1st-level helper key is valid for the time period T 1 (time), and a 1st-level helper key can be updated at any time. Def. 1 formally addresses this, and Fig. 1 illustrates the key-update mechanism. Security Definition. Security of IKE is based on the assumption that adversary does not (illegally) obtain all of the target user's keys all at once. Recall that helper keys of different levels in the hierarchy are managed differently (most likely stored at different places). It is unlikely for such an event to occur, i.e. an adversary to obtain all of the keys of all levels all at once, considering that PDs are disconnected from the network most of the time. We also like to remind that it gets much harder to steal the keys as the levels in the hierarchy increase this is because PDs in the higher levels are connected to the network less frequently and also managed in places physically much safer.
Definition 1 (IKE)
We consider an attack model based on the standard IND-ID-CCA setting in [7, 8] plus the next case: when an adversary is allowed access to any of target user's keys and also the helper keys but excluding the combinations of keys that can trivially lead to the target key (from the definition of IKE). Next, we give some examples of key exposures for our security definition.
Examples of Key Exposures. We consider a 2-level IKE: decryption key is renewed every day, 1st-level helper key is renewed every three months and 2nd-level helper key is never updated. Then, any ciphertext for 2005/Dec./31st should not be decrypted by dishonest means even for the following cases: We do not consider these cases. Next, we formally address the security definition. In our attack model, adversary is allowed access to the following four types of oracles: (1) key generation oracle KG(·, s, p), which on input U , returns . This models partial exposure of honest user's keys including the victim's keys. The adversary may query the four oracles adaptively in any order he wants subject to the restriction that he makes only one query to LR. Let U * be the user's identifier of this query, and let c * , time * denote the challenge ciphertext returned by LR in response to this query. Also, the adversary is not allowed to ask KG and KI for queries which can trivially determine U * 's decryption key for time * from the definition of IKE. The adversary succeeds the attack by guessing the value b, and the scheme is considered to be secure if any probabilistic polynomial time adversary has success probability negligibly close to 1/2. Definition 2 (KE-CCA security) Let IKE be a 2-level identity-based key-insulated encryption scheme. Define adversary A's succeeding probability as:
where U * is never asked to KG(·, s, p) and A is not allowed to query
. A can ask KI for any keys of any users if there exists a "special level" j ∈ {0, 1, 2} such that
is never asked for any time, and
• KI(i, U * , time, s, p) is never asked for any (i, time) such that i < j and Exposure of Key-Update Information. If we look closer into the security of IKE, it can be realized that exposure of key-update information should also be considered in addition to the above discussion. Although, we can also see that it is obvious that if δ i T i (time) can be computed from d i T i (time) and d i t for any time and t, then, exposure of key-update information can be simulated by using KI. Hence, if this property holds, then the security definition so far discussed will be sufficient (by itself) even when exposure of the key-update information is considered. As a matter of fact all of our constructions satisfy this property.
Straightforward IKE from HIBE is Insecure
Although HIBE and IKE are alike in some sense, it is not as simple as bringing HIBE as building blocks to construct KE-CCA secure IKE. We give further discussion on this later, but first, we clarify the relation between HIBE and IKE.
Brief Review of HIBE. HIBE distributes the workload of the PKG in IBE by organizing the PKGs in a hierarchical tree structure. Security definition of an HIBE follows. This definition runs parallel with [24] which is the hierarchical extension of Boneh and Franklin's IBE [7, 8] . Note that 1-level HIBE refers to a standard IBE. A user in an HIBE hierarchy is defined as a tuple of identities:
where t denotes depth of the hierarchy. The user's ancestors in the hierarchy tree include the root-PKG and users/sub-PKGs whose identities are Security of an HIBE is defined as follows. An adversary adaptively selects a target user's identity and equal length messages m 0 , m 1 and submits to a left-or-right encryption oracle LR which returns ciphertext of m b such that b ∈ R {0, 1} for a target user. The adversary also have access to a decryption oracle D which gives decryption results of any ciphertext except for the challenge ciphertext from LR. There is also a key generation oracle KG which exposes any user key except for the target's and its ancestors'. HIBE is secure if an adversary correctly determines b with probability at most 1/2 + neg where neg is negligible. HIBE is IND-HID-CCA (resp. IND-HID-CPA) if unlimited access to D and KG (resp. only KG) is allowed [24] . HIBE is IND-wHID-CCA (resp. IND-wHID-CPA) if unlimited access (resp. no access) to D is allowed while the number of queries to KG is bounded as follows [25] : unlimited access is allowed for at least one level in the hierarchy, but for the rest of the levels, the number of queries do not exceed the threshold value w such that w = O(poly(k)). See Appendix A for more details. Renewal of decryption keys in IBE from HIBE is described in [25] as well.
Definition 3 (HIBE) A t-level hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) HIBE consists of 3 + t algorithms: HIBE
= (PGen HIBE , Gen i HIBE (1 ≤ i ≤ t),s D t−1 . Similarly, for 2 ≤ i ≤ t, Gen t−i+1 HIBE takes D t−1 .D t−2 . · · · .D t−i , s D t−1 .D t−2 .
···.D t−i+1 and p as inputs, and outputs
We show a straightforward construction of an IKE from HIBE which is insecure (i.e. not KE-CCA secure). The above (insecure) construction does not satisfy the security of 2. and 3. of the Examples of Key Exposures. from the previous section. Namely, if the 1st-level PD (or the PD-BC) is stolen at 2005/Oct./1st/0:00, then confidentiality of the ciphertexts generated during period 2005/Oct.-Dec. is lost. Morover, exposure of the 2nd-level helper key can alone compromise the security for any time period. Therefore, a straightforward construction of IKE from HIBE is not KE-CCA secure.
Generic Construction
Basic Idea. As shown in the previous section, straightforward construction of an IKE from HIBE is vulnerable, and for such a system, loss of only one of users' PDs implies compromisation of the entire system. In this section, we show a generic construction of a secure IKE built from three distinct HIBEs. Here's the general idea: each of three HIBEs each plays a part to mutually secure the different types of key exposures, consequently, protecting the system totally, guaranteeing its security even if a PD is compromised. We extend a technique called multiple encryption proposed in [29] to construct a KE-CCA secure IKE from HIBE. It is important to note that the original [29] Fig. 2 shows a generic construction of KE-CCA secure IKE from any HIBE where each of HIBEs has only chosen plaintext security, i.e. IND-HID-CPA (See Appendix A). Here, we give supplementary explanation of the Fig. 2 and give discussion on our generic construction in more details.
Construction.
Let
is encrypted by h-level HIBE HIBE h for identity U h where U 1 := U , U 2 := U.T 0 (time) and U 3 := U.T 1 (time).T 0 (time). Here, the technique in [29] is applied (but not straightforwardly, as mentioned earlier) to securely integrating the three underlying HIBEs. Dec IKE recovers each of the three shares and composes them to recover the plaintext. It also checks the validity of the ciphertext by re-encryption. Namely,
otherwise output m . This scheme can easily be generalized to an -level IKE for arbitrary ≥ 1. Random Oracle. If we want to eliminate random oracle, multiple encryption technique in [12] can be extended instead of the one we used of [29] to construct a KE-CCA secure IKE, assuming that underlying HIBEs are all IND-HID-CCA in the standard model, e.g. [11, 4, 5, 6, 28] , while the above construction using [29] requires only IND-HID-CPA HIBEs. Furthermore, by applying a similar method to our proposed scheme, we can construct another KE-CCA secure IKE from HIBE with only one-wayness under chosen plaintext attacks. Strongly Secure Hierarchical "Standard" Key-Insulated Encryption. By extending the multiple encryption technique mentioned in the above, we can construct a generic construction of a strongly secure key-insulated encryption [13] from a chosen plaintext secure IBE and a chosen plaintext secure standard public key encryption. This method used here can also be applied to the Cocks IBE [10] to construct a strongly secure key-insulated encryption. (The Boneh-Franklin IBE based scheme was proposed earlier in [9] ).
Definition 4 (γ-uniformity [22])
In the following, we give brief description of a generic construction of strongly secure key-insulated encryption: Let PKE := (Gen PKE , Enc PKE , Dec PKE ) be a semantically secure public key encryption scheme where Gen PKE , Enc PKE , Dec PKE are algorithms for key generation, encryption and decryption, respectively. Also let IBE := (PGen IBE , Gen IBE , Enc IBE , Dec IBE ) be an IND-ID-CPA identity-based encryption scheme [8] (i.e. IND-HID-CPA for t = 1) where PGen IBE , Gen IBE , Enc IBE , Dec IBE are algorithms for public-parameter generation, user-secret generation, encryption and decryption, respectively (note that IBE is equivalent to a 1-level HIBE). A user then computes Gen PKE (1 k ) = (dk, ek) and PGen IBE (1 k ) = (s, p) for security parameter k, and publicizes (ek, p). User keeps dk and stores s in his PD. To renew his decryption key at time period t, PD computes Gen IBE (t, s, p) = s t and sends the output value to the user. This output, keyupdate information, is used to update the decryption key, (dk, s t ) at time t. When encrypting a message m for time period t, m 1 , m 2 , r 1 and r 2 such that m 1 + m 2 = m are picked uniformly at random, and Enc PKE (m 1 ||r 1 , ek; H 1 (m, m 1 , r 1 , r 2 )) = c 1 and Enc IBE (m 2 ||r 2 , t, p; H 2 (m, m 2 , r 1 , r 2 )) = c 2 are computed, where H 1 and H 2 are random oracles. Finally, a ciphertext, (c 1 , c 2 ) is generated. It is obvious that m can be recovered from (c 1 , c 2 ) using the decryption key (dk, s t ). Moreover, a chosen ciphertext attack does not occur for the next two cases: (1) exposure of unlimited number of decryption keys for any time periods except for t and (2) exposure of s. This is the first generic construction ever built of a strongly secure key-insulated encryption from IBE and standard public key encryption in the random oracle model. Security proof is similarly done as in Theorem 1. Moreover, by using a similar method used in the previous subsection, we can extend the above scheme to be hierarchical as well. Then we also have the first hierarchical construction of a strongly secure key-insulated encryption.
Efficient Construction from Bilinear Mapping
Basic Idea. In the previous section, we showed a construction of KE-CCA secure IKE using HIBE as a black-box. Here, we propose a construction of KE-CCA secure IKE by directly extending GentrySilverberg HIBE (GS-HIBE) [24] (see also Appendix C) and Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion [21, 22] . The major difference between our two construction is as follows: in our specific construction, h-level HIBEs for 1 ≤ h ≤ 3 are being integrated using a homomorphic property of pairing, while our generic construction is based on multiple encryption [29] . A specific construction (we will describe in this section) is more efficient than our generic construction. Note that since our specific construction is based on a very specific assumption, i.e. BDH assumption, it may lack flexibility in designing new construction in terms of security.
validity check by re-encryption return c, time return m Figure 3 : KE-CCA Secure IKE from Bilinear Mapping.
Construction.
As shown in Fig. 3 , a 2-level IKE IKE = (PGen IKE , Gen IKE , Δ-Gen i IKE , Upd i IKE (i = 1, 2), Enc IKE , Dec IKE ) can be constructed using bilinear mapping. Here, we give supplementary explanation of the Fig. 3 and give discussion on our specific construction in more details.
From bilinear mapping, a 2-level IKE IKE = (PGen IKE , Gen IKE , Δ-Gen i IKE , Upd i IKE (i = 1, 2), Enc IKE , Dec IKE ) can be constructed as follows.
PGen IKE generates two cyclic groups G 1 and G 2 of prime order q and an efficiently computable mappingê : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 such thatê(aP, bQ) =ê(P, Q) ab for all P, Q ∈ G 1 and any positive integers a, b. This does not send all pairs in G 1 × G 1 to the identity in G 2 . Also, PGen IKE chooses cryptographic hash functions
where n denotes the size of the message space. The security analysis will view H 1 , H 2 , H 3 as random oracles. It further generates master key s and its corresponding public paramter Q. Gen IKE , Δ-Gen i IKE and Upd i IKE (i = 1, 2) are the same as in the generic construction based on [24] . Based on the homomorphic property of pairing, Enc IKE and Dec IKE integrates three HIBE encryptions into one. Although, not mentioned in Fig. 3 , to protect from active attacks, Dec IKE outputs ⊥ and halts if (
3 × {0, 1} n+k 1 or (iii) re-encryption of m for U , time and μ is not identical to c , time .
Theorem 2
The above scheme is a KE-CCA secure 2-level IKE in the random oracle model assuming that a computational BDH (CBDH) problem [7, 8] 
assuming time for exponentiation over G 1 is at most τ EXP , and time for pairing computation is at most τê.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Efficiency. In a pairing based scheme, the dominant factor that decides its total computation cost is the number of pairing computation carried out. For the above construction of KE-CCA secure IKE from bilinear mapping, only one and three pairing computations are required for encryption and decryption, respectively. On the other hand, for the generic construction (shown in the previous section) using [24] as the underlying HIBE, the numbers of pairing computation for encryption and decryption are three and six, respectively. Hence, in terms of computational cost, our specific construction surpasses the generic construction based on [24] in efficiency. This result can be generalized for -level IKE for any > 1 as shown in Table 1 .
Generic HIBE from Any IBE
As seen from our discussion given so far, HIBE serves as important role as building blocks of various cryptographic schemes including the ones that we have proposed. In this section, we show a generic construction of HIBE from arbitrary IBE that also provides a partial solution to an open problem of HIBE. We can, for example, bring the Cocks IBE [10] to construct an HIBE, also implying that hereafter a new construction of an IBE is ever proposed, it can also be converted to construct an HIBE. For the security definition, we introduce partial collusion resistance (i.e. IND-wHID-CCA) [25] instead of full collusion resistance (i.e. IND-HID-CCA) [24] . The security definition is more relaxed but our contribution is significant as this is the first generic HIBE construction built from an arbitrary IBE. In this section, for simplicity, we show a construction of a 2-level HIBE, but it can also be extended for a t-level HIBE for t > 2.
Security Definition. Our construction of a generic HIBE proposed here is based on the security definition of [25] . Particularly, for our 2-level construction of HIBE, it is collusion free for the users (in the lower domain), but has polynomial-sized collusion threshold w for the sub-PKGs (in the higher domain), where w = O(poly(k)) and k is a security parameter. Table 1 : Numbers of pairing computations in the pairing based scheme and the generic scheme based on [24] . encryption decryption pairing based scheme 1 + 1 generic scheme + 1
validity check by re-encryption return m Cover Free Family. We use cover free family (CFF) [17] as a building block, similar to the generic construction of key-insulated encryption [13] . Reminding that, method used in [13] only addresses chosen plaintext security, and cannot be applied straightforwardly to construct a chosen ciphertext secure HIBE.
Definition 5 (CFF) Let
It should be noted that there exist nontrivial constructions of CFF with u = O(w 2 log v) and #F i = O(w log v) (1 ≤ i ≤ v) . In the following, we assume #F 1 = #F 2 = · · · = #F v =û for someû and
Concrete methods for generating CFF are given in [18] .
Construction. Fig. 4 shows a generic construction of a chosen ciphertext secure 2-level HIBE with partial collusion resistance from an arbitrary IND-ID-CPA IBE using CFF. Here, we give supplementary explanation of the Fig. 4 and give discussion on our generic construction of HIBE in more details.
Let IBE = (PGen IBE , Gen IBE , Enc IBE , Dec IBE ) be standard IBE (i.e. 1-level HIBE). Then, 2-level HIBE HIBE = (PGen HIBE , Gen i HIBE (i = 1, 2), Enc HIBE , Dec HIBE ) can be constructed as follows. PGen HIBE generates (u, v, w)-CFF (L, F ) and u pairs of master key and public parameter of IBE where
For hash functions, n denotes the size of a message of HIBE, and COIN represents the internal coin-flipping space of Enc IBE , assuming that n + k 1 is the size of a message in IBE. The security analysis will view H and H i (1 ≤ i ≤ u) as random oracles. Gen 2 HIBE picks master keys corresponding to F D 1 . Gen 1 HIBE generates IBE decryption keys by using s D 1 = {s i } i∈F D 1 . Enc HIBE encrypts m with encryption algorithms which correspond to F D 1 where R is a concatenation of all r i arranged in increasing order of i for i ∈ F D 1 . Dec HIBE decrypts all c i for i ∈ F D 1 . Then, it re-encrypts m with m i and r i . Unless the encryption result is identical to c , Dec HIBE outputs ⊥, otherwise, outputs m .
• IND-HID-CPA if, for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary A who is not allowed to submit any query to D at all, |Succ A,HIBE − 1/2| is negligible (particularly, we call IND-ID-CPA if t = 1),
• IND-wHID-CCA if, for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary A who is allowed to submit queries to KG at most w times for given layers in the hierarchy, |Succ A,HIBE − 1/2| is negligible (A is also allowed to submit unlimited number of queries to KG for at least one layer),
• IND-wHID-CPA if, for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary A who is allowed to submit queries to KG at most w times for given layers in the hierarchy, but no query to D is permitted, |Succ A,HIBE − 1/2| is negligible (A is also allowed to submit unlimited number of queries to KG for at least one layer).
Next, we give concrete examples for the above IND-wHID-CCA and IND-wHID-CPA. Suppose we have a 2-level HIBE which includes a root-PKG layer, a sub-PKG layer and a user layer. The sub-PKG layer is set as the special layer in which the number of queries from the adversary is bounded. In the INDwHID-CCA (or IND-wHID-CPA) setting, an adversary is allowed to ask the sub-PKGs' keys for at most w times while allowing unlimited number of user's decryption keys to be exposed. In addition to KG, the adversary is allowed access to D also when considering the IND-wHID-CCA setting.
Simulation of KI. Interestingly, answers to A's KI oracle query can be perfectly simulated by B when i is the "special level" (see Def. 2) chosen by A. Namely, B can perfectly answer any KI oracle query by using B's own KG oracles which corresponds to HIBE a and master keys s h (1 ≤ h ≤ 3, h = a) which correspond to HIBE h . It should be noticed that the simulation is perfect even if U = U * . 
Simulation of D. On
Also, if letting t A be A's running time, then B's running time can be estimated to be t B , where
assuming that the number of queries made to KG and KI is q KI and q KI , respectively, and running time of Gen 1, 3 form H 1 (U ), H 1 (U.T 1 (time)) and H 1 (U.T 1 (time).T 0 (time)), respectively. Also, queries ψ 2 and ψ 3 have been asked to H 2 and H 3 , respectively, and ψ 2 and ψ 3 formê(Q, ψ 1,1 ) H 3 (ψ 3 ) and (μ, m), respectively, for some μ and m. If there exists such a combination whose corresponding ciphertext is identical to c, time , B returns m. Otherwise, B returns ⊥.
When A outputs b , B also outputs b as an answer of the IND-HID-CCA game for the 3-level GS-HIBE. Now, we estimate B's succeeding probability. Simulations of LR, H h (1 ≤ h ≤ 3) and KG are perfect. Simulation of KI fails only when 2 is not the "special level" chosen by A. Therefore, if we let 1/2 + A be the succeeding probability of A, then B's succeeding probability can be estimated to be 1/2 + B where B ≥ and γ are all negligible, and therefore, our proposed generic construction of HIBE is IND-wHID-CCA with a restriction that an adversary is not allowed to ask KG for more than w times.
